The POSCO case demonstrates the monstrosity of "imminent domain" crashing into the right of "catalytic property" and resulting in the sort of mess that makes perfectly well meaning people conclude that no other option is left but "majoritarian tyranny" or aggression. I will talk about the non-aggressive solution in a little bit, but to set the scene first: what has happened is some unfenced, unused government owned land, allocated to a large infrastructure project by a multinational, has been homesteaded by local farmers who are growing cash crops on it. The state wants to clear the homesteaders with a small compensation while the homesteading farmers are demanding the same compensation for vacating the land that title holding property owners received. Activists and agitators have arrived on the scene muddying up all this cozy deal making between the state and giant mercantile interests for "development" - how else could we have development unless the almighty, benevolent state does it for us?
India is being wracked by repetitions of this sort of statist predation of property rights, with the same common theme of state aggression and large corporate interests. In the forests where India's indigenous libertarian people reside, most of the property rights are held without title deed, but the problem has surfaced even where no homesteading issue complicates the affair, like in Bengal where only privately owned farm land was in play. There we are confronted with a "majoritarian tyranny" issue, as a minority of farmers chose not to sell their land and Tata's new Nano car project fell through. The political fallout proved disastrous for the ruling communists at the election.
The happy thought of communist downfall aside, the first thing that almost anyone would embrace about a free market, is that it would compel such deals to be concluded peacefully between buyers and sellers, with the state playing no other part except the prevention (or termination) of aggression. If there are 500 farmers then it is up to the buyer to persuade them as a group or as individuals. The farmers who need the money most will very likely sell first, while others for whom farming is working well enough may hold out for a higher price. In any case 500 sales have to be closed, as sellers have different prices because they value the land according to their individuality.
In tightly knit communities the farmers may choose to bargain collectively if they are aware of the buyer's larger interest. This will probably result in a higher total cost for the land but it saves the buyer the costs of closing 500 deals. The case of 400 farmers 'Yea' and 100 farmers 'Nay' can only occur if a price is being fixed. The 100 'Nays' all have a price at which point they will switch to 'Yeas'. It is an error to think a price fixed by the state is "just" when it is in fact coercion. It is usually a strong persuasion in rural communities when most of one's neighbors want to do something anyway, so I see no reason why "majoritarian tyranny" has to be kicked in at a certain fixed number. Such haste is aggression against precisely those who value the land most, and who wish to push the price higher. How could it be "just" to coerce them? Why shouldn't they demand more comprehensive compensation, like equity sharing? Cash today is not gold or silver, it is a piece of paper that loses value unless expertly invested, whereas land is a capital asset that earns and earns and earns. So is "cash for land" truly a just exchange in this context? or is it the exploitative consequence of a fatal information asymmetry?
How the farmers arrive at their agreement is of no concern to the state so long as no aggression occurs. The state's idea of "national interest" is simply the interest of the politicians, bureaucrats and their clients, more appropriately termed "criminal interest". There is NEVER a "national interest" in the aggression of rights, it is always a criminal interest.
ADDENDA:
it is the government's duty to put a fence or employ a guard or whatever, the government has no business holding land just for holding it and using it to extort - if you have to enforce "imminent domain" then the compensation to homesteaders has to be negotiated, without coercion, based upon loss of income they will experience - whenever the state makes life "easy" for one person it is at the cost of "uneasiness" for someone else, always, by an immutable economic law
Swami Agnivesh came up during the JP movement, he knows there is no substitute for parliament when rule of law has collapsed
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